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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,
1
 Justice Anthony Kennedy 
delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion which upheld a town board’s 
practice of inviting citizens of the town to deliver a ceremonial prayer to 
open the monthly board meetings.
2
 Although almost all of the prayers 
were sectarian in the sense that they mentioned Jesus Christ, the Court 
specifically found that the town board permitted anyone to deliver the 
opening remarks and that the town’s non-discrimination policy made 
this practice constitutional under the provision in the First Amendment 
 
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; Distinguished Professor and C. Blake 
McDowell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. I wish to thank the Akron 
chapters of the Jewish Law Students Association and the Federalist Society for inviting me to 
debate Professor Patrick Garry on this topic. 
 1.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding practice of Town Board 
in conducting a ceremonial prayer at the commencement of meetings of the board). 
 2.  Id. at 1828. 
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prohibiting “the establishment of religion.”3 In this Article, I discuss the 
role of tradition and policy in the context of this case and in the 
interpretation generally of the Constitution. 
The great jurisprudential battle that has raged in the Supreme Court 
for nearly a century, and the question that our society has struggled with 
since the advent of the Civil War, is whether the Constitution is a 
command by our ancestors that we retain the same political structures, 
social hierarchies, and cultural traditions that they had; or, whether the 
Constitution reflects ideals of liberty, equality, fairness, and tolerance to 
which our ancestors aspired and to which they expected us to aspire.
4
 
That struggle between rules and standards, doctrine and principles, 
conventionalism and consequentialism, tradition and policy in the 
interpretation of the Constitution is played out again within Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway. 
Professor Garry was right, and I was wrong, about how the 
Supreme Court would rule in Town of Greece v. Galloway and in the 
reasoning that Justice Kennedy would embrace in resolving that case.
5
 
As our distinguished guest predicted in our debate, the Supreme Court 
upheld the practice of sectarian Christian prayer conducted by the Town 
Board of Greece, and as he further predicted, Justice Kennedy utilized a 
“historical” mode of analysis justifying such prayers on the ground that 
local governments have traditionally engaged in the practice. Justice 
Kennedy seemingly overruled decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence 
that had interpreted the Establishment Clause by reference to the purpose 
and effect of the challenged state action; instead, Justice Kennedy 
appeared to elevate “custom” to be the primary determinant of 
constitutionality. 
But all is not lost. Justice Kennedy’s reliance upon custom, or 
“tradition,” as the principal touchstone of constitutional interpretation is 
tenuous. Although Justice Kennedy prepares his opinions with tradition, 
he always leavens them with policy. Justice Kennedy is not a reliable 
partner to Justice Antonin Scalia and the other conservative justices in 
 
 3.  See id. at 1816 (stating, “The town at no point excluded or denied an opportunity to a 
would-be prayer giver. Its leaders maintained that a minister or layperson of any persuasion, 
including an atheist, could give the invocation.”); id. at 1824 (stating, “So long as the town 
maintains a policy of nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search beyond its 
borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”). 
 4.  Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 5.  I participated in a debate with Professor Patrick Garry hosted by The University of Akron 
School of Law. After that debate, Professor Garry published a summary of his arguments.  See 
generally Patrick M. Garry, Prayer and the Meaning of the Establishment Clause: A Debate on 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 6 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POLY 1 (2015).  
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their attempt to “turn back the clock” to the days when intolerance was 
the norm and government was powerless to unseat privilege. While 
attentive to tradition in this case and others, Justice Kennedy ultimately 
bases his decisions upon the deeper meaning and ultimate purposes of 
the Constitution. Therein lies hope for the future. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Section II discusses Justice 
Kennedy’s balancing of tradition and policy in previous cases, while 
Section III discusses that balance in Town of Greece v. Galloway. 
Section IV argues that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is consistent with a 
rigorous understanding of separation of church and state in that the 
government may not dictate the content of official prayers. Section V 
argues that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is consistent with his position that 
offense taken in response to official prayers or religious displays is not 
constitutionally relevant. Finally, Section VI discusses the future of the 
neutrality principle. 
II.   JUSTICE KENNEDY’S BALANCING OF TRADITION AND POLICY IN 
PREVIOUS CASES 
In the field of fundamental rights, Justice Kennedy has repeatedly 
demonstrated that he is not beholden to tradition. In Lawrence v. Texas,
6
 
a case striking down a law that made homosexuality a crime, Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “history and tradition are the starting point but not in all 
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.”7 In 
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
8
 although concurring with the majority that 
under the circumstances the petitioner did not have a constitutional right 
to be recognized as the lawful father of the child, Justice Kennedy left 
open the possibility that such a right might exist in special 
circumstances. In that case, he joined Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion, where Justice O’Connor warned the majority that it 
must not “foreclose the unanticipated” by adopting a strictly historical 
approach to constitutional analysis.
9
 Most recently, in United States v. 
Windsor,
10
 Justice Kennedy implicitly found that preserving traditional 
 
 6.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law making same-sex 
intercourse a crime). 
 7.  Id. at 572 (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 8.  Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying petitioner’s claim to be the lawful 
father of a child born to a married woman). 
 9.  Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I would not foreclose the unanticipated by 
the prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.”). 
 10.  United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down provision of federal law 
that refused to recognize same-sex marriages for purposes of federal law). 
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notions of marriage was not even a legitimate reason for the federal 
government to refuse to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples
11
 
and ruled that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was unconstitutional 
because of its unlawful purpose and effect.
12
 
The tension between conformity to tradition and mindfulness of 
consequences was also evident in Justice Kennedy’s recent opinion in 
United States v. Alvarez,
13
 a First Amendment case in which the 
Supreme Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute that 
made it a crime to lie about having earned military honors. In his opinion 
for the Court, Justice Kennedy looked first to history, declaring that this 
type of law was not consonant with tradition: 
The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government ad-
vances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection. 
Our prior decisions have not confronted a measure, like the Stolen 
Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.
14
 
In defining and circumscribing that tradition, however, Justice Kennedy 
resorted to consequentialist analysis. Justice Kennedy noted that while 
many longstanding criminal laws make lying a crime, there is a crucial 
difference between those traditional kinds of laws and the Stolen Valor 
Act. The Stolen Valor Act, wrote Justice Kennedy, is different from 
perjury, fraud, and defamation because of the effects that flow from such 
speech. Justice Kennedy distinguished cases involving “defamation, 
fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false 
statement, such as an invasion of privacy or the costs of vexatious 
litigation.”15 In contrast, the Stolen Valor Act was not intended to 
redress a concrete harm visited upon individuals but, rather, sought to 
vindicate a widely-shared cultural belief that it is wrong to lie about 
having been awarded military honors. As Justice Kennedy pointed out, 
 
 11.  See id. at 2693 (Kennedy, J.) (stating, “The arguments put forward by BLAG are just as 
candid about the congressional purpose to influence or interfere with state sovereign choices about 
who may be married.”); Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of 
the U.S. House of Representatives, United States v. Windsor at 28, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-
307), 2013 WL 267026 (stating, “multiple rational bases support Congress’ decision to retain the 
traditional definition of marriage for federal-law purposes”). 
 12.  See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-95 (Kennedy, J.) (identifying the unlawful purposes and 
effects of the federal law); e.g., id. at 2693. Justice Kennedy states: 
This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that 
class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose 
a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex mar-
riages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States. 
 13.  United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking down federal Stolen Valor 
Act). 
 14.  Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, J.). 
 15.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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counterspeech is the proper remedy to redress that type of harm.
16
 The 
problem with the Stolen Valor Act, ruled Justice Kennedy, was that it 
punished utterances regardless of the setting of the speech, the speaker’s 
purpose, or the nature of the harms that were likely to result.
17
 In short, 
while Justice Kennedy purported to invoke tradition in striking down the 
Stolen Valor Act, in reality he based his decision on the purpose and 
effect of the law. 
So it is in Town of Greece v. Galloway as well. While upholding 
the practice of ceremonial prayer as consistent with our nation’s 
traditions, Justice Kennedy nevertheless ruled that the constitutionality 
of the practice ultimately turns upon its purpose and effect. 
III.   JUSTICE KENNEDY’S BALANCING OF TRADITION AND POLICY IN 
TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY 
For over forty years, the Supreme Court has utilized 
consequentialist reasoning to define the parameters of the Establishment 
Clause. Throughout this period, the constitutionality of government 
action under the Establishment Clause has turned upon the actual intent 
and practical effect of such action. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,
18
 a 1971 case 
authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court stated that, to be 
constitutional, the government’s action must have both a secular intent 
and a primarily secular effect.
19
 In 1989, in County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union (“Allegheny County”),20 Justice 
Blackmun tweaked the Lemon test to mean that the government must not 
act with the intent to endorse religion, nor may the primary effect of the 
 
 16.  See id. at 2549 (stating, “The Government has not shown, and cannot show, why 
counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”); id. at 2550 (stating, “The remedy for 
speech that is false is speech that is true.”). 
 17.  See id. at 2547. Justice Kennedy stated: 
Here the lie was made in a public meeting, but the statute would apply with equal force 
to personal, whispered conversations within a home. The statute seeks to control and 
suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings. 
And it does so entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of 
material gain. 
 18.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state laws channeling public 
funds to religious schools). 
 19.  Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted): 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria de-
veloped by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. 
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not 
foster “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” 
 20.  Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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law be to endorse religion.
21
 Justice Kennedy dissented in Allegheny 
County
22
 and in Salazar v. Buono in 2009,
23
 and although he applied the 
“no endorsement” test, he signaled that he continued to doubt whether it 
was the proper test.
24
 One of the closely watched questions in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway was whether Justice Kennedy would apply the “no 
endorsement” test or whether he would switch to a “tradition” test. 
Professor Garry correctly predicted that he would embrace the 
“tradition” test. 
Tradition is the preferred interpretive mode of conservatives 
generally, for obvious reasons. Traditionally, same-sex couples could 
not marry;
25
 traditionally, women were not eligible to attend military 
academies;
26
 traditionally, capital punishment was not considered “cruel 
and unusual.”27 Liberals, in contrast, usually utilize a policy approach to 
interpret the Constitution, such as the Equal Protection principle that 
“persons who are similarly situated must be treated alike”;28 the 
understanding that the Due Process Clause guarantees “the opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”;29 or the 
idea that the concept of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
 
 21.  See id. at 592 (stating, “In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to 
whether the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ 
religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 22.  See id. at 655-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 23.  Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2009) (remanding the case to the district court to permit 
it to determine whether the primary effect of the government’s action regarding the cross had been 
to endorse religion). 
 24.  See id. at 720 (Kennedy, J.) (stating, “Even if, however, this standard were the 
appropriate one . . .”). 
 25.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (Kennedy, J.) (citing the 
House Report on the Defense of Marriage Act and stating, “The House Report announced its 
conclusion that ‘it is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the 
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage”‘); id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating, “As I 
have observed before, the Constitution does not forbid the government to enforce traditional moral 
and sexual norms.”). 
 26.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating, 
“Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half . . . . It counts for nothing the long 
tradition, enduring down to the present, of men’s military colleges supported by both States and the 
Federal Government.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163 (1976) (ruling that the penalty of death for 
the crime of murder does not under all circumstances constitute “cruel and unusual punishment”). 
 28.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) 
(stating, “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall 
‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (stating, “The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’”) (citation omitted). 
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prohibits the government from interfering with an individual’s “intimate 
and personal choices” concerning family life or bodily integrity.30 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kennedy briefly rejected 
the “no endorsement” test in favor of the “tradition” test. In referring to 
Allegheny County, Justice Kennedy quoted the dissenters approvingly: 
Four dissenting Justices disputed that endorsement could be the proper 
test, as it likely would condemn a host of traditional practices that rec-
ognize the role religion plays in our society, among them legislative 
prayer and the “forthrightly religious” Thanksgiving proclamations is-
sued by nearly every President since Washington.
31
 
Justice Kennedy did not expressly overrule the result in Allegheny 
County, nor did he expressly state that the Establishment Clause permits 
the government to endorse religion. He did, however, proceed to analyze 
the constitutionality of the Town Board’s practice by looking to 
tradition, and he found that “[t]he prayers delivered in the town of 
Greece do not fall outside the tradition this Court has recognized.”32 
Moreover, he did not analyze whether the ceremonial prayers had the 
purpose or effect of advancing, promoting, or endorsing religion. 
However, there are portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that 
preserve the “purpose” and “effect” prongs of the “no endorsement” test. 
Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasized that prayers before official 
bodies are a form of “ceremonial prayer,” intended to solemnize an 
occasion, and that if in practice the prayer deviates from this historical 
purpose it would become unconstitutional: 
In rejecting the suggestion that legislative prayer must be nonsectarian, 
the Court does not imply that no constraints remain on its content. The 
relevant constraint derives from its place at the opening of legislative 
sessions, where it is meant to lend gravity to the occasion and reflect 
values long part of the Nation’s heritage. Prayer that is solemn and re-
spectful in tone, that invites lawmakers to reflect upon shared ideals 
and common ends before they embark on the fractious business of 
governing, serves that legitimate function. If the course and practice 
 
 30.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). The Court stated: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State. 
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
 31.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1821 (2014). (quoting Cnty. of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)). 
 32.  Id. at 1824. 
18 JUSTICE KENNEDY’S OPINION IN TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY [6:1 
over time shows that the invocations denigrate nonbelievers or reli-
gious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion, many pre-
sent may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the 
purpose of the occasion and to unite lawmakers in their common ef-
fort. That circumstance would present a different case than the one 
presently before the Court. 
The tradition reflected in Marsh permits chaplains to ask their own 
God for blessings of peace, justice, and freedom that find appreciation 
among people of all faiths. That a prayer is given in the name of Jesus, 
Allah, or Jehovah, or that it makes passing reference to religious doc-
trines, does not remove it from that tradition. These religious themes 
provide particular means to universal ends. Prayer that reflects beliefs 
specific to only some creeds can still serve to solemnize the occasion, 
so long as the practice over time is not “exploited to proselytize or ad-
vance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.
33
 
 Another legitimate purpose of ceremonial prayer that Justice 
Kennedy approves is to recognize members of the clergy for their 
contributions to the community: 
The inclusion of a brief, ceremonial prayer as part of a larger exercise 
in civic recognition suggests that its purpose and effect are to 
acknowledge religious leaders and the institutions they represent rather 
than to exclude or coerce nonbelievers.
34
 
Even though Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the “no endorsement” 
test, he implicitly retained it. In effect, Justice Kennedy implicitly ruled 
that the official prayers in this case had neither the purpose nor the 
primary effect of endorsing religion, but rather were made to solemnize 
the occasion and to recognize religious leaders in the community. In 
future cases, if the plaintiffs can prove that the purpose and effect of an 
official prayer does not serve a legitimate purpose such as solemnization 
or recognition, then the prayer would be unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion invokes not only tradition 
but a principle that is consistent with the most rigorous understanding of 
separation of church and state – the necessity that the government must 
not dictate the content of prayers whatever the setting. 
IV. THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT DICTATE THE CONTENT OF OFFICIAL 
PRAYERS 
The plaintiffs in this case did not contend that ceremonial prayers at 
 
 33.  Id. at 1823 (emphasis added). 
 34.  Id. at 1827 (emphasis added). 
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all official functions are unconstitutional.
35
 That option was foreclosed 
by the case Marsh v. Chambers,
36
 in which the Supreme Court upheld 
the practice of a prayer to open legislative sessions.
37
 This particular 
litigation strategy proved to be wise; in Town of Greece v. Galloway, not 
a single Justice of the Court voted to overrule Marsh v. Chambers.
38
 
Instead the petitioners argued that the Town Board’s prayer practice 
violated the Constitution because the Town Board had followed a 
consistent pattern of inviting Christian pastors who invariably delivered 
sectarian prayers.
39
 The petitioners contended, and the dissenters found, 
that this pattern of conduct constituted official endorsement of one 
particular religion.
40
 In particular, the petitioners suggested that the 
Town Board should have instructed its guest clergy to deliver 
nonsectarian prayers.
41
 
The argument that the government is required to promote 
nonsectarian prayer was bound to lose. Justice Kennedy had expressed 
the opposing view vigorously and at some length in the 1992 case of Lee 
v. Weisman.
42
 In that case, Justice Kennedy struck down a prayer that 
was offered at a high school graduation even though school officials had 
given careful guidelines to their guest, Rabbi Gutterman, and the Rabbi 
followed those guidelines and composed and delivered a wonderful 
 
 35.  See generally Brief for Respondents at 19, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 
(2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5230742 (stating, “Petitioner and its amici seek to extend Marsh far 
beyond what it actually decided.”). 
 36.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding state legislature’s practice of 
beginning legislative session with a chaplain’s prayer). 
 37.  See id. at 795 (upholding the “unbroken practice” of legislative prayer). 
 38.  See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1841-42 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (stating, “I agree with the 
Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s tradition of beginning 
each session with a chaplain’s prayer.”). 
 39.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 34. 
 40.  See id. at 58 (defending the “endorsement” test against an “anemic version of the 
coercion test”); Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1841 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating, “Having applied my 
legal judgment to the relevant facts, I conclude, like Justice KAGAN, that the town of Greece failed 
to make reasonable efforts to include prayer givers of minority faiths, with the result that, although 
it is a community of several faiths, its prayer givers were almost exclusively persons of a single 
faith.”). 
 41.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 34, at 18 (stating, “Petitioner does not ask its guest 
chaplains to avoid proselytizing or disparaging remarks, let alone to pray in an inclusive manner. 
With no instruction to do otherwise, petitioner’s guest chaplains routinely offer prayers acceptable 
only to Christians.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 39-40, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. 
Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 5939896. Attorney Douglas Laycock stated: 
We think the town needs a policy. The policy should give guidelines to chaplains that 
say: Stay away from points in which believers are known to disagree. And we think the 
town should do what it can to ameliorate coercion. It should tell the clergy: Don’t ask 
people to physically participate. That’s the most important thing. 
 42.  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prohibiting prayer at public school graduation). 
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nonsectarian prayer.
43
 Justice Kennedy stated that the fact that school 
officials sought to control the content of the prayer actually counted 
against its constitutionality.
44
 Here is Justice Kennedy’s explanation in 
Lee v. Weisman of the difference between the government’s role in 
Freedom of Expression cases and Establishment Clause cases: 
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different 
mechanisms. Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even 
when the government participates, for the very object of some of our 
most important speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea 
as its own. The method for protecting freedom of worship and freedom 
of conscience in religious matters is quite the reverse. In religious de-
bate or expression, the government is not a prime participant, for the 
Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical to the freedom of 
all. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and 
worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First 
Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on 
forms of state intervention in religious affairs, with no precise coun-
terpart in the speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson of 
history that was and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the 
lesson that, in the hands of government, what might begin as a tolerant 
expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and 
coerce. A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of be-
lief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is 
real, not imposed.
45
 
 According to Justice Kennedy, although it is perfectly 
constitutional for the government to express its own views on most 
subjects, the government is not permitted to express its opinion about 
matters of religion. In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy made it clear 
that the government could not cure a violation of the Establishment 
Clause by seeking to control the content of an officially-invited prayer. 
He said: 
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian 
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-
Christian tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which, 
for example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus 
Christ, or to a patron saint. 
. . . Though the efforts of the school officials in this case to find com-
 
 43.  See id. at 581-82 (setting forth the facts of the case). 
 44.  See id. at 588 (stating, “Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the 
‘Guidelines for Civic Occasions,’ and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian. Through 
these means the principal directed and controlled the content of the prayers.”). 
 45.  Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added). 
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mon ground appear to have been a good faith attempt to recognize the 
common aspects of religions, and not the divisive ones, our precedents 
do not permit school officials to assist in composing prayers as an in-
cident to a formal exercise for their students. And these same prece-
dents caution us to measure the idea of a civic religion against the cen-
tral meaning of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which is 
that all creeds must be tolerated, and none favored. The suggestion 
that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means 
of avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds 
strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted.
46
 
 In essence, Justice Kennedy takes the position that if prayer is 
allowed in an official setting, then the government may not interfere 
with its content. All people have the right to express their own religious 
views in a manner consistent with their own faith tradition. This includes 
people who are invited to deliver ceremonial prayers at the opening of 
official functions.
47
 In light of Justice Kennedy’s position on this 
question, there was no chance of persuading him that the problem with 
the prayers uttered before the meetings of the Town Board of Greece 
was that they praised Jesus. In his opinion in Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, Justice Kennedy stated: 
To hold that invocations must be nonsectarian would force the legisla-
tures that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to decide these 
cases to act as supervisors and censors of religious speech, a rule that 
would involve government in religious matters to a far greater degree 
than is the case under the town’s current practice of neither editing or 
approving prayers in advance nor criticizing their content after the 
fact.
48
 
Justice Kennedy’s position in this case is consistent with the oft-quoted 
language from Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette:
49
 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstanc-
 
 46.  Id. at 589-90 (emphasis added). 
 47.  See, e.g., Program, Swearing-In Ceremony for President Barack H. Obama: Fifty-Seventh 
Inaugural Ceremonies (Jan. 21, 2013), available at http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-
in/event/barack-obama-2013 (listing the Invocation by Myrlie Evers-Williams and the Benediction 
by The Reverend Dr. Luis Leon). 
 48.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014). 
 49.  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
22 JUSTICE KENNEDY’S OPINION IN TOWN OF GREECE V. GALLOWAY [6:1 
es which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
50
 
  The concept that the government is powerless to interfere with 
the content of prayers is consistent with another persistent theme of 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence – that purely subjective objections to 
other people’s conduct are not a constitutionally sufficient reason to 
prohibit people from engaging in that conduct. 
V. OFFENSE TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO OFFICIAL PRAYERS OR RELIGIOUS 
DISPLAYS IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY RELEVANT 
Another consistent precept that Justice Kennedy has followed is 
that purely moral considerations are not sufficient to justify a legal 
obligation or prohibition. Justice Kennedy applied this principle in a 
string of significant cases to strike down laws discriminating against 
gays and lesbians.
51
 More broadly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized that a bare desire to harm a class of persons,
52
 mere 
disagreement with an idea,
53
 irrational fear of a group of people,
54
 or 
moral disapproval of certain conduct,
55
 without more, are not sufficient 
under the Constitution to justify laws treating groups of people 
differently or restricting human liberty. 
In the context of the Establishment Clause, this means that just 
because someone objects to an official prayer or a religious display on 
public property does not mean that the prayer or display is 
 
 50.  Id. at 642. 
 51.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Kennedy, J.) (striking down state 
constitutional provision precluding the adoption of laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
 52.  See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking 
down federal law intended to prevent “hippies” from qualifying for food stamps, and stating, “[I]f 
the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very 
least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a 
legitimate governmental interest.”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (striking down state law making it 
a crime to desecrate a venerated object as applied to a person who burned the American flag in 
protest, and stating, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”). 
 54.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) 
(stating, “[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly 
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally 
retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple dwellings, and the like.”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating, “Moral 
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection 
Clause because legal classifications must not be “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.”) (citation omitted). 
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unconstitutional. The Establishment Clause is not violated because a 
person is offended by an official prayer or a religious display on public 
land, nor is it violated because a person does not hold the same religious 
belief that is being expressed by the government. Here is what Justice 
Kennedy said about “offense” in his opinion for the majority in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway: 
In their declarations in the trial court, respondents stated that the pray-
ers gave them offense and made them feel excluded and disrespected. 
Offense, however, does not equate to coercion.
56
 
 The purpose of the Establishment Clause is not to protect us from 
religious messages we disagree with. Its purpose is to protect us from the 
unification of church and state. A person could love the religious 
message that the government is sending and still object to it on the 
ground that the government has violated the Establishment Clause by 
expressing that view. When the courts enforce the Establishment Clause, 
they are not protecting religious dissenters or minority religions – that is 
the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause. Instead, the 
Establishment Clause protects every citizen against the grave threat of 
official religion. 
Justice Kennedy’s position on this point is consistent with the 
position of the Court in Freedom of Expression, Equal Protection, and 
Right to Privacy cases. Just as moral outrage is not a legitimate reason to 
deny same sex couples the right to marry
57
 or the right of a protestor to 
burn the American flag,
58
 it is also irrelevant in determining whether the 
government has violated the Establishment Clause. 
The essence of a violation of the Establishment Clause is that the 
government has taken a position on a religious question or is interfering 
with the internal governance of a religious organization or has allowed a 
religious institution to exercise some sort of governmental power in a 
manner that advances its religion. Just as government may not dictate the 
content of prayers, so it may not take a position on any question of 
religion. It is unconstitutional for the government to say that God exists; 
and it is equally unconstitutional for the government to say that God 
does not exist. 
The concept that the government may not take a position on 
religious questions leads us to the final portion of this essay wherein I 
discuss a question that Justice Kennedy does not address – in my 
opinion, the most important issue in the field of Freedom of Religion – 
 
 56.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1826 (2014). 
 57.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 58.  See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. 
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and that is whether the Constitution requires that the government must 
remain neutral in matters of religion. 
VI.    WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLE? 
The first words of the First Amendment – the first words of the Bill 
of Rights – protect Freedom of Religion: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .
59
 
These two clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause, must be read in tandem. As noted above, until now the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to mean that the 
government may not advance, promote, or endorse religion.
60
 In 
addition, the Court has interpreted the Free Exercise Clause to mean that 
the government may not intentionally hinder or interfere with the 
exercise of religion.
61
 For nearly 70 years the Supreme Court has 
recognized the principle that the government must remain neutral with 
respect to religion. Many of our greatest justices have emphasized that 
the neutrality principle is at the core of Freedom of Religion: 
Justice Hugo Black, Everson v. Board of Education (1947):
62
 
[The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations 
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not re-
quire the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used 
so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.
63
 
Justice Tom Clark, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp 
(1960):
64
 
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through 
a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable 
citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize 
through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government 
to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, 
to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the 
 
 59.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 60.   See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
 61.  See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting the ritual slaughter of animals). 
 62.  Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding government-subsidized 
transportation of children to both public and parochial schools). 
 63.  Id. at 18 (Black, J.) (emphasis added). 
 64.  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (ruling that Bible readings 
and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in public school were unconstitutional). 
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State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
65
 
Justice David Souter, McCreary County v. Kentucky ACLU (2005):
66
 
The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the “First Amend-
ment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, 
and between religion and nonreligion.” When the government acts 
with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it 
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious 
neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible 
object is to take sides.
67
 
Justice Scalia has expressly and emphatically rejected both the “no 
endorsement” test and the neutrality principle.68 In his view, the 
government does not have to remain neutral with respect to religion, and 
it is perfectly constitutional for the government to advance, promote, or 
endorse religion.
69
 
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kennedy favors a 
“tradition” approach over the “no endorsement” test. But he does not 
even mention the “neutrality” principle, which has until now been the 
lodestone for interpretation of the Religion Clauses.
70
 
I am hopeful that Justice Kennedy and a majority of the Court will 
continue to support the principle that the government must remain 
neutral on questions of religion. I find support for this in Justice 
Kennedy’s statement that the Town Board’s practice would have been 
unconstitutional if the purpose and effect of the ceremonial prayer had 
been something other than to solemnize the occasion;
71
 in his 
implication that people’s agreement or disagreement with the content of 
 
 65.  Id. at 226 (Clark, J.) (emphasis added). 
 66.  McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (ruling 
display of Ten Commandments in county courthouse unconstitutional). 
 67.  Id. at 860 (Souter, J.) (emphasis added). 
 68.  See id. at 889 (Scalia, J. dissenting): 
With all of this reality (and much more) staring it in the face, how can the Court possibly 
assert that “‘the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between . . . reli-
gion and nonreligion,’” and that “[m]anifesting a purpose to favor . . . adherence to reli-
gion generally,” is unconstitutional? Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitu-
tion. Surely not the history and traditions that reflect our society’s constant 
understanding of those words. 
 69.  See id. at 891 (stating that the government may take action “undertaken with the specific 
intention of improving the position of religion”); id. at 893 (suggesting that the government can 
“favor” one monotheism over polytheism and atheism in the public acknowledgement of religious 
belief); id. at 894 (suggesting that it is only unconstitutional if the government endorses a 
“particular religious viewpoint”). 
 70.  Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014). See cases cited supra notes 
61-66 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1823. 
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a religious message is irrelevant in determining the constitutionality of 
government action under the Establishment Clause;
72
 and in his 
observation that the government has no power to censor prayers that are 
uttered in official settings.
73
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This was a close case; a hard case. It turned principally upon a 
question of fact: did the Town Board of Greece give people of all faiths 
a fair opportunity to solemnize the proceedings before the Town Board 
in an act of ceremonial prayer or its secular equivalent? Reasonable 
people disagreed on that question of fact, and a majority of the Court 
resolved that issue in favor of the Town Board. 
Reasonable people may differ, as they did in this case, on the 
proper application of the neutrality principle. But the principle itself is 
enduring. The founders of this country did not struggle and sacrifice to 
preserve a specific tradition of official prayer, but rather for the 
overarching principle that the government must always remain neutral 
towards religion. 
 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
